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Abstract
BACKGROUND—In November and December 2012, 6 patients at a hemodialysis clinic were 
given a diagnosis of new hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection.
OBJECTIVE—To investigate the outbreak to identify risk factors for transmission.
METHODS—A case patient was defined as a patient who was HCV-antibody negative on clinic 
admission but subsequently was found to be HCV-antibody positive from January 1, 2008, through 
April 30, 2013. Patient charts were reviewed to identify and describe case patients. The 
hypervariable region 1 of HCV from infected patients was tested to assess viral genetic 
relatedness. Infection control practices were evaluated via observations. A forensic 
chemiluminescent agent was used to identify blood contamination on environmental surfaces after 
cleaning.
RESULTS—Eighteen case patients were identified at the clinic from January 1, 2008, through 
April 30, 2013, resulting in an estimated 16.7% attack rate. Analysis of HCV quasispecies 
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identified 4 separate clusters of transmission involving 11 case patients. The case patients and 
previously infected patients in each cluster were treated in neighboring dialysis stations during the 
same shift, or at the same dialysis station on 2 consecutive shifts. Lapses in infection control were 
identified. Visible and invisible blood was identified on multiple surfaces at the clinic.
CONCLUSIONS—Epidemiologic and laboratory data confirmed transmission of HCV among 
numerous patients at the dialysis clinic over 6 years. Infection control breaches were likely 
responsible. This outbreak highlights the importance of rigorous adherence to recommended 
infection control practices in dialysis settings.
Hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is several times more prevalent among hemodialysis 
patients than the general US population.1–3 Outbreaks of new HCV infections have been 
reported in US dialysis centers, typically associated with lapses in infection control (IC), 
including improper parenteral medication handling and preparation, inadequate cleaning and 
disinfection of environmental surfaces between patient treatments, and poor hand hygiene 
and glove use.3–5
In November 2012, the Philadelphia Department of Public Health (PDPH) was notified of 2 
patients at an outpatient hemodialysis clinic (Clinic A) who had documented seroconversion 
to HCV antibody positive status. Four additional seroconversions were identified in 
December 2012. Despite interventions by the clinic after PDPH assessed IC practices and 
provided recommendations, a new HCV infection was identified in April 2013. PDPH and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) performed an epidemiologic 
investigation to evaluate the extent of the outbreak and assess potential modes of 
transmission and risk factors for HCV acquisition.
METHODS
The clinic performed HCV antibody tests upon admission for all patients and then annually 
in January for susceptible patients. Monthly serum alanine aminotransferase (ALT) tests 
were performed on all patients. When ALT levels were elevated, HCV antibody testing was 
performed.
Definitions
We defined an incident case patient as a Clinic A patient who was HCV-antibody (anti-
HCV) negative upon admission screening but subsequently found to be anti-HCV positive 
(ie, “newly infected”). A previously infected patient was one who was anti-HCV positive 
upon admission to Clinic A. Susceptible (ie, at-risk) patients were those not infected with 
HCV (ie, anti-HCV negative) upon admission.
Because most cases were asymptomatic, case patients’ estimated date of onset of HCV 
infection was defined as the first date the serum ALT level was above the upper limit of the 
normal range (ie, >45 IU/mL). The exposure period was defined as 3 months to 2 weeks 
prior to the estimated date of onset. For incident case patients whose seroconversion was not 
preceded by a documented serum ALT elevation, we defined the exposure period as the 6 
months to 2 weeks before the first positive anti-HCV result.
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Case Finding
We reviewed HCV test results of all patients who were treated at the clinic from January 1, 
2008, through April 30, 2013 (including active patients and patients who transferred out or 
died), to identify incident case patients and previously infected patients.
Case Description
For all infected patients identified through case finding, medical records were abstracted and 
data were entered into Epi Info, version 7 (CDC). We obtained treatment schedule and 
station data—that is, the dialysis stations and shifts of patients’ treatment sessions—for all 
incident cases during their exposure periods. We compared station assignments and 
treatment schedules among infected patients identified as having closely related virus to 
evaluate potential links in space and time.
Case patients were interviewed by PDPH to identify hepatitis C risk factors during exposure 
periods, symptoms of acute hepatitis C, and whether patients were notified of their diagnosis 
and referred for HCV treatment evaluation.
Laboratory Testing
Serum samples collected from HCV-infected patients (ie, incident case patients and 
previously infected patients) at the clinic in April 2013 were sent to CDC’s Division of Viral 
Hepatitis Laboratory. HCV RNA was amplified by real-time polymerase chain reaction from 
anti-HCV positive samples. HCV RNA-positive samples underwent sequencing of the 300-
nucleotide NS5b coding region to determine genotype as described.6 In addition, the HCV 
hypervariable region 1 was sequenced to determine HCV quasispecies using the Roche/ 454 
pyrosequencing technology.6 A phylogenetic tree was developed to illustrate and compare 
the hypervariable region 1 quasispecies distribution of incident cases and previously infected 
patients.
IC Observation
We observed patient flow and IC practices at the clinic. We focused on (1) staff hand 
hygiene and glove use, (2) vascular access care, (3) parenteral medication preparation and 
administration, and (4) environmental and machine surface cleaning and disinfection 
between shifts and at the end of day. A standard set of tools was used to record our 
observations (http://www.cdc.gov/dialysis/prevention-tools/index.html).
Environmental Assessment
An environmental assessment was performed with 3 objectives: (1) to identify blood 
contamination on surfaces, (2) to confirm the presence of human hemoglobin in potential 
blood contamination identified, and (3) to assess cleaning practices.
To identify potential invisible blood contamination on surfaces, we used Bluestar Forensic 
latent blood reagent (Bluestar), a forensic chemiluminescent agent that reacts with 
hemoglobin. Bluestar Forensic was used to identify the possible presence of blood on 
dialysis machines and patient chairs after terminal cleaning and on chairs in the clinic’s 
waiting area and in the patients' bathroom. An immune assay (Hexagon OBTI; Bluestar) was 
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used to confirm the presence of human hemoglobin. We were able to perform only 1 
assessment when no patients were being treated and all the machines and chairs had been 
cleaned and disinfected the evening before.
To evaluate the thoroughness of cleaning, we applied Glo Germ oil (Glo Germ) to a dialysis 
machine’s high-touch surfaces before completion of the last dialysis shift on the day of the 
assessment. After cleaning was performed, we exposed surfaces to UV light; fluorescence 
upon exposure to UV light indicates persistence of Glo Germ because of lack of adequate 
cleaning. This exercise was used to demonstrate to staff the importance of thorough cleaning 
and disinfection.
RESULTS
Description of Clinic A
Clinic A was a stand-alone dialysis center with 66 patients being dialyzed at the time of the 
investigation. The clinic had a total of 24 stations in 3 pods. Each pod had a total of 8 
stations in 2 rows (4 stations in each row). Dialysis machines were close to each other, with 
no barrier between them. The clinic operated 3 shifts on a Monday-Wednesday-Friday 
schedule. Shifts 1 and 2 were very busy, and the transition time between those shifts was 
short, approximately 15 to 20 minutes.
There were 6 technicians (usually 2 assigned to each pod), 2 registered nurses, and 1 
licensed practical nurse working per shift. The clinic maintained a log of technician and 
nurse schedules, along with the stations where specific patients were dialyzed each day, 
which were not assigned and could change daily.
Case Patient Characteristics
Of Clinic A’s 66 patients in April 2013, 26 (39%) were infected with HCV. Case finding 
identified a total of 18 patients who seroconverted since 2008 (Figure 1). Eight case patients 
seroconverted in 2012 (n = 7) or 2013 (n = 1) on the basis of their first anti-HCV positive 
tests. Forty-eight Clinic A patients were at risk during this time, thus the attack rate for 
2012–2013 was 16.7% (8/48). Figure 1 describes the exposure periods and dates of the first 
positive HCV test for all 18 case patients. Only 3 case patients had documented symptoms 
consistent with acute hepatitis: 1 reported vomiting, 2 reported diarrhea. Two case patients 
had no ALT elevation (ie, all documented ALT values prior to seroconversion were normal); 
neither of them showed any symptoms suggestive of acute hepatitis. Table 1 describes the 
characteristics of case patients. Although 14 case patients (78%) had hospitalizations and 10 
(56%) had invasive procedures during their exposure period, no common exposures (eg, 
overlap in hospitalizations or same surgeries) were identified. Three case patients had died 
and the cause of death was not reported in the charts.
Quasispecies Analyses of Infected Patients
Twenty-three serum samples from 13 case patients and 10 previously infected patients at the 
clinic in April 2013 were available for additional laboratory testing. Of these 23 patients, 11 
case patients and 2 previously infected patients belonged to 4 clusters (Figure 2).
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Given the high homology (99.66% nucleotide identity) and close clustering of HCV 
quasispecies between case patient P and 1 previously infected patient, HCV transmission 
could have occurred from this patient to case patient P. For the other clusters, there was a 
link between patients in each cluster; however, the transmission direction is more difficult to 
speculate. Secondary transmission could have occurred in any of the clusters.
We reviewed the treatment time and dialysis station assignment data for case patients and 
previously infected patients in each cluster to assess commonalities. For each cluster, the 
treatment station data for the exposure period of patients who seroconverted later was 
compared with the data for the same period of patients who were infected earlier. In each 
cluster, there was evidence that the case patients and previously infected patients were 
treated in nearby stations during the same shift, or at the same station on 2 consecutive shifts 
(with the case patients following the patients who were infected earlier). Most of these 
stations where transmission occurred were located in 1 particular pod.
IC Observations
Before our investigation, when PDPH visited the clinic in December 2012 and when the 
clinic’s manager performed audits of IC, lapses in IC practices were identified (eg, staff 
moved between machines without changing gloves or used ungloved hands without hand 
hygiene after touching machines, the clinic did not clearly label clean sinks and dirty sinks, a 
stationary medication cart in the nursing station within the treatment area was used as the 
location for medication preparation). The clinic then moved medication preparation to a 
separate room away from the patient care area and had only nurses draw the parenteral 
medications instead of technicians. During our investigation, generally good hand hygiene 
and aseptic technique during parenteral medication preparation and administration were 
observed. However, multiple lapses in IC were identified (Table 2). Most lapses were during 
vascular access (eg, lack of appropriate glove change and hand hygiene during vascular 
access procedures, inadequate application of antiseptic) and cleaning and disinfection of 
environmental surfaces (eg, insufficient application of disinfectant, wiping machine surfaces 
with patient still in station, not disinfecting all surfaces).
Environmental Assessment
Table 3 lists the objects selected for assessment and results. The dialysis chair with reaction 
to Bluestar Forensic solution and positive Hexagon OBTI result was in the implicated pod 
mentioned above. This prompted us to inspect all the chairs in the clinic and we identified 
visible bloodstains on the inside of the armrests of 4 of the chairs, indicating that the chairs 
were not thoroughly cleaned.
In summary, bloodstains were seen on 1 dialysis machine, on dialysis station televisions, and 
on patient chairs. Three samples produced a positive Hexagon OBTI result: 1 from the 
dialysis chair side table, 1 from the chair in the waiting area, and 1 from a dialysis station 
television. Multiple surfaces tested positive by Bluestar Forensic but negative by Hexagon 
OBTI. We attributed these results to either an extremely low concentration of blood in the 
samples or a false-positive reaction to dried bleach on the surfaces.
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The use of Glo Germ on a machine identified numerous areas that were not cleaned 
thoroughly. We used this test as an educational tool to show technicians, facility managers, 
and the medical director where cleaning was suboptimal.
DISCUSSION
We identified multiple clusters of transmission of HCV at Clinic A with a total of 18 newly 
infected patients from January 1, 2008, through April 30, 2013. Genetic links between 
infected patients’ viruses and analysis of epidemiologic data (treatment station assignment, 
healthcare exposures) supported our hypothesis that transmission occurred to case patients at 
Clinic A, most likely owing to lapses in IC.
We observed multiple lapses in IC practices, including vascular access care, hand hygiene, 
as well as cleaning and disinfection of dialysis stations. The presence of bloodstains on 
multiple surfaces at the clinic pointed to poor environmental cleaning and disinfection. 
Although not observed at the time of our investigation, poor medication handling practices, 
including the preparation of medications on a cart in the treatment area, might also have 
been a risk factor. In addition, Clinic A presumably restricted technicians from performing 
medication administration because they might not have adhered to recommended aseptic 
technique. We believe that these suboptimal IC practices likely contributed to the repeated 
transmission of HCV among patients in Clinic A. These factors are well-known causes of 
HCV transmission in this setting.3–5,7–10 The transmission of HCV among patients who 
were in proximity during the same shift or shared a station between consecutive shifts has 
also been reported.11–13
In this investigation, 15 case patients lacked documented symptoms and 2 lacked ALT 
elevations. These 2 case patients were identified by reviewing serial anti-HCV results; the 
new acute HCV infection case definition used by the National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System does not require clinical symptoms if a documented seroconversion 
occurs (http://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/conditions/hepatitis-c-acute/case-definition/2012/). This 
highlights the importance of routine hepatitis C serology testing, which is a recommended 
practice.14,15 The clinic identified the seroconversions in 2012 and 2013 as a result of 
screening and reviewing tests; however, previous case patients had not been promptly 
identified. Therefore, when routine ALT and HCV screening is performed, providers should 
review the results and take appropriate action in a timely manner15; early intervention at the 
clinic before 2012 could have prevented many subsequent HCV infections. Unfortunately, in 
this clinic, and as with another investigation,4 we found that not all case patients were 
informed of their HCV diagnosis.
Our environmental testing allowed us to confirm human blood contamination on surfaces at 
the clinic. The use of forensic chemiluminescent agents and hemoglobin detection kits to 
identify blood contamination in dialysis settings has been reported.7,16 In a previous 
outbreak, Bluestar Forensic was used with limited success.12 The agent requires a 
completely dark environment that can be difficult to achieve in healthcare facilities. In 
addition, the agent also reacts with bleach, which is a widely used disinfectant in dialysis 
clinics. In this investigation, we were able to arrange a completely dark environment in a 
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laboratory room for the testing. To address the potential for false-positive results from 
bleach, we used Hexagon OBTI to confirm the presence of human hemoglobin. We believe 
this provided more convincing evidence of blood contamination of surfaces at the clinic.
This investigation raised several issues regarding clinic management and layout. First, we 
believe that the space available for each station at the clinic was not adequate—for example, 
we observed 2 dialysis machines in use within 1 foot of each other. The Facility Guidelines 
Institute’s Guidelines for Design and Construction of Hospitals and Outpatient Facilities 
recommends a space of 80 square feet for each treatment station and a minimum of 4 feet 
(1.22 meters) between dialysis chairs, which was not followed at Clinic A.17 Clinics not 
meeting these criteria should consider expanding the space for each station and between 
stations, or install walls between stations to reduce crowding between patients and 
equipment that could facilitate cross-contamination. Second, the clinic operated only 3 days 
per week. We believe this condensed schedule contributed to the crowding in the facility; 
quick turnaround time between shifts may have also increased the workload burden on staff, 
all of which could lead to suboptimal IC practices. A 6-day-per-week schedule is more 
typical in facilities of similar size and patient volume. This was suggested to the clinic as 
one way to reduce the number of patients dialyzed per day and spread out treatments in 
space and time. Third, poor IC practices have been highlighted many times as contributors to 
HCV outbreaks in dialysis settings5; therefore, having strong IC support at the clinic is 
important. The support may include (1) providing regular infection prevention training to 
staff and performing staff competency assessments, (2) having a sufficient number of staff to 
ensure all IC procedures are performed adequately throughout the day, and (3) having a staff 
member on site with infection prevention expertise to serve as an IC manager, perform 
practice audits, and address breaches in a timely manner. The necessary support for IC 
should be made as a policy at both the clinic level and the corporate level. Following the 
investigation, PDPH worked with Clinic A to provide multiple training sessions to clinic 
staff. The clinic increased turnaround time between patient treatment shifts to allow 
adequate environmental cleaning and disinfection but maintained the 3-day-per-week 
operations schedule. The clinic also used audit tools to routinely audit IC practices. Follow-
up visits by PDPH confirmed improved IC practices at the clinic.
We also want to highlight the importance of HCV surveillance, prompt reporting of new 
infections to health departments, and referral of infected patients to medical care. Current 
guidelines recommend routine HCV antibody testing every 6 months for all susceptible 
patients, and at more frequent intervals following the identification of 1 or more 
seroconversions.14,15 Because infected patients often lack symptoms, timely testing and 
careful review of results are critical to identifying new HCV infections. In the wake of this 
outbreak, Clinic A performed monthly HCV antibody and ALT testing of all uninfected 
patients under the guidance of PDPH. As of December 2013, no new cases had been 
identified and the clinic has resumed semiannual anti-HCV screening. The effort to 
frequently screen, communicate results to patients, and refer infected patients to care 
requires coordination between clinic staff, its medical director, and specialists outside the 
facility.
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The investigation had several limitations. First, we were unable to obtain blood samples 
from all cases to perform viral sequencing because some patients had died. Therefore, the 
relatedness of some cases was unknown. Second, we were not able to perform the 
environmental assessment using Bluestar on all the machines and chairs as well as the 
medication preparation area because of the facility lighting. We were also unable to interrupt 
the patient care schedule to assess adequacy of cleaning in between patient treatments (vs at 
the end of the day). The former would be a more relevant representation of surface 
contamination experienced by most patients. However, evidence of blood contamination on 
the randomly chosen machine and chair may reflect the generally suboptimal cleaning and 
disinfection practice at Clinic A. Finally, there were important changes in IC practices (eg, 
injectable medication preparation) that occurred before our investigation. Therefore, our 
observations might not reflect the breaches that contributed to transmission.
In conclusion, this was one of the largest outbreaks of HCV infection among dialysis 
patients that we have encountered in the past decade. Although it remains critically 
important for dialysis clinic staff to continue adherence to current recommended IC practices 
to prevent spread of HCV and other infections, more aggressive strategies may be needed to 
stop HCV outbreaks from occurring in outpatient hemodia-lysis centers.
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Figure 1. 
Exposure period and first hepatitis C virus (HCV)–positive test of 18 case patients, Clinic A, 
2008–2013. Anti-HCV, antibody to HCV. , Positive HCV test (anti-HCV or HCV RNA); 
, Case patients’ exposure period (cluster 1); , Case patients’ exposure period 
(cluster 2); , Case patients’ exposure period (cluster 3); , Case patient P’s 
exposure period; , Other case patients’ exposure period.
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Figure 2. 
Results of hepatitis C virus (HCV) quasispecies analysis of 13 case patients and 10 
previously infected patients at Clinic A. HVR, hypervariable region.
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Table 1
Characteristics of 18 Case Patients, Clinic A
Characteristic Cases
Male sex, n (%) 9 (50)
Age, median (range), y 63.5 (37–86)
Black race, n (%) 18 (100)
History of diabetes, n (%)a 9 (50)
History of hypertension, n (%) 14 (78)
Time from first hemodialysis to seroconversion, median (range), months 37.8 (5.6–220.1)
Symptoms of acute HCV infection, n (%) 3 (17)
Highest documented ALT, median (range), IU/mLb 183 (51–535)
During exposure period
 Most common treatment pod
  Pod 1, n (%) 18 (100)
 Most common treatment shift
  Shift 3, n (%) 10 (56)
Heparin injection, n (%) 11 (61)
Iron sucrose injection, n (%) 8 (44)
Paricalcitol injection, n (%) 14 (78)
Erythropoietin injection, n (%) 14 (78)
CVC used for hemodialysis vascular access, n (%) 3 (17)
History of intravenous use, n (%) 0 (0)
Hospitalized or had hospital visit, n (%) 14 (78)
Had invasive procedure, n (%) 10 (56)
Other risk factors identified through interview (n =12)
 Close contact of confirmed or presumptive case, n (%) 1 (8)
 Received blood products, organs, or tissues, n (%) 3 (25)
 Exposure to another person’s blood, n (%) 0 (0)
 Sexual contact, n (%) 5 (42)
 Sexual contact without condoms, n (%) 3 (25)
 Injecting drugs, n (%) 0 (0)
 Tattoo, piercing, n (%) 0 (0)
NOTE. ALT, alanine aminotransferase; CVC, central venous catheter; HCV, hepatitis C virus.
aGlucose meter use was observed and found to be adequate.
b2 case patients did not have documented elevation of ALT.
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Table 2
Summary of Key Infection Control Observations
Infection control area Tools used Positive practices Selected suboptimal practices
Hand hygiene (HH)14,18 http://www.cdc.gov/dialysis/prevention-tools/ • Staff 
successfully 
used 72 
(82%) of 88 
observed HH 
opportunities
• Good HH 
before and 
after 
medication 
administration
• Good HH 
when leaving 
patient 
stations
• HH duration and 
thoroughness were 
not always 
adequate
• HH not performed 
in between 
touching the 
patient during a 
vascular access 
procedure and 
touching the 
machine's screen/
keyboard
• HH inconsistently 
performed before 
gloving
• One doctor was 
seen not 
performing HH 
before or after 
direct contact with 
patients
Medication preparation and 
administration14,19,20
http://www.cdc.gov/injectionsafety/IP07_standardPrecaution.html
http://www.cdc.gov/injectionsafety/providers/provider_faqs.html
• Separate 
room used for 
medication 
preparation 
(although a 
cart was used 
in patient care 
area before 
December 
2012)
• Generally 
good HH and 
glove use 
when 
administering 
medication
• Catheter hubs and 
vial tops were not 
scrubbed 
vigorously with 
antiseptic swab
• Medication 
preparation was 
performed next to 
a sink, which could 
cause exposure to 
water splash
Vascular access care14,21–23 http://www.cdc.gov/dialysis/prevention-tools/ • Consistent 
use of face 
shields and 
gloves
• Staff usually 
touched multiple 
objects (eg, screen, 
keyboard) with the 
same gloves 
between steps of 
the access 
procedure
• Staff were seen not 
performing HH 
before donning 
gloves for 
cannulation and 
needle removal 
procedures
• Cleanliness and 
rigorousness of 
antiseptic 
application varied
Cleaning and disinfection14,24,25 http://www.cdc.gov/dialysis/prevention-tools/ • Some staff 
performed 
• Most dialysis 
machines were 
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Infection control area Tools used Positive practices Selected suboptimal practices
cleaning 
thoroughly
• Most times 
dialysis chairs 
were 
observed to 
be visibly wet 
with 
disinfectant
wiped with 
disinfectant while 
patient who just 
completed 
treatment was still 
in the chair
• Staff did not 
consistently check 
the machine for 
visible soil/blood 
before cleaning
• Staff cleaned and 
disinfected the 
machines when 
potentially 
contaminated items 
were still on the 
side table, very 
close to the 
machines being 
cleaned
• The machines were 
visibly wet with 
disinfectant in only 
2 of 9 observed 
cleaning sessions
• Vigorousness of 
wiping varied
• Cleaning and 
disinfection 
procedures were 
not performed in a 
standard manner
• There were usually 
missed or 
undercleaned 
areas, eg, priming 
bucket and chair’s 
side tables; the 
priming bucket 
was rarely 
disinfected during 
observation
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Table 3
Results of Environmental Assessments
Tested object Tested area Bluestar Forensic test Hexagon OBTI test Interpretation
Dialysis machine 1
Screen No reaction … …
Keyboard Reaction Negative Cross-reaction with remnant bleach or 
extremely low concentration of blood
Acid and base administration 
port
No reaction … …
Machine’s right side Not tested … Visible bloodstains near blood 
pressure holder
Artery blood pressure cuff Reaction Negative Cross-reaction with remnant bleach or 
extremely low concentration of blood
Prime bucket Reaction Negative Cross-reaction with remnant bleach or 
extremely low concentration of blood
Dialysis machine 2
Screen No reaction … …
Keyboard No reaction … …
Acid and base administration 
port
Reaction Negative Cross-reaction with remnant bleach or 
extremely low concentration of blood
Machine’s right side Reaction Negative Cross-reaction with remnant bleach or 
extremely low concentration of blood
Blood pressure cuff No reaction … …
Prime bucket No reaction … …
Dialysis chair
Headrest No reaction … …
Armrest No reaction … …
Footrest No reaction … …
Chair side No reaction … …
Side table Reaction Positive Invisible bloodstain
Two chairs in waiting area
Seat surface Reaction (1 chair) Positive Invisible bloodstain
Bathroom
Sink Reaction Negative Cross-reaction with remnant bleach or 
extremely low concentration of blood
Door handle No reaction … …
Light switch No reaction … …
Toilet handle No reaction … …
4 television sets within dialysis stations
4 sets with visible stains (of 24 
sets)
Not tested Positive (1 stain tested) Visible bloodstain
Biohazard trash can with visible blood stain
Opening area of can Strong reaction Positive Served as positive control
NOTE. Bluestar Forensic is a forensic chemiluminescent agent that reacts with hemoglobin; Hexagon OBTI is an immune assay used to confirm 
the presence of human hemoglobin.
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